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THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL PROSECUTION OF CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE METABOLITES UNDER UTAH CODE § 41-6A-517
Joshua C. Snow*
This Article achieves three main goals. First, it explains and
explores Utah’s per se metabolite laws against the backdrop of the
national landscape of metabolite laws. Second, this Article provides a
concise explanation regarding the science of drug metabolites. Finally,
this Article presents two constitutional challenges to Utah Code section
41-6a-517. The first challenge argues that the statute creates an
impermissible status offense in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution. The second challenge argues that the statute violates
Utah’s Uniform Operation of Laws Clause found in the Utah
Constitution. This Article concludes by asking Utah state courts and
state legislature to examine the validity of Utah Code section 41-6a-517
and ultimately to overturn the statute.
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine Steve. Steve, a recent graduate of the University of Utah S.J.
Quinney College of Law, has never used illegal drugs or been in trouble with the
law. But the stress of studying for his looming bar exam has begun to take an
emotional toll. Acting on the advice of his less-than-law-abiding friends, Steve
purchased a small quantity of marijuana thinking a few “hits” would relieve the
anxiety and pressure he was feeling. The following Saturday he locked himself in
his bedroom and smoked several marijuana cigarettes. He spent the remainder of
Saturday and Sunday alone in his apartment. The immediate effects of the
marijuana wore off quickly, but come Monday morning Steve felt relaxed and
ready to face another week of studies. Before Steve left for his bar prep class, he
decided to clean his car. Steve placed the car key in the ignition, turned on the
electrical components of the car, and rolled the driver’s side window down. Steve
sat down in the driver’s seat and began sorting through a pile of papers. As Steve
was finishing the sorting, an officer on bike patrol approached Steve’s car to ask
for directions.
In his incident report, the officer stated he could immediately smell the odor
of marijuana in the car. After briefly speaking with Steve, the officer reported he
was certain the smell was coming from Steve’s person. The officer arrested Steve
on suspicion of being in actual physical control of a motor vehicle with a
measureable controlled substance in the body in violation of Utah Code section 41* © 2013 Joshua C. Snow. Joshua Snow is a trial attorney with the Salt Lake Legal
Defender Association. He earned his Juris Doctor in 2012 at The George Washington
University Law School.
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6a-517(2). Steve had exhibited no signs of intoxication during the encounter, nor
did he engage in any dangerous, threatening, or suspicious behavior. A blood test
was performed that revealed a trace presence of a pharmacologically inactive
marijuana metabolite—a byproduct of the parent drug made as the human body
processes the parent drug—in Steve’s system.
After a quick trial, Steve was convicted as charged based solely on the
testimony of the officer and the toxicology report. Steve’s license was suspended
for 120 days, he was ordered to pay a fine of $1,000, he was placed on supervised
probation, and, if he violates his probation, he could be placed in jail for up to six
months. Also, Steve now bears the stigma of his conviction and must explain the
conviction to the Character and Fitness Committee of the Utah Bar Association,
his future employer, friends, and family.
This Article examines how, despite the fact that Steve did not engage in any
dangerous or threatening behavior that fateful Monday morning, he was
successfully prosecuted under Utah Code section 41-6a-517 (Metabolite Statute)
and explains why such prosecutions are unconstitutional. The Article first
discusses the structure of the Metabolite Statute and what conduct is criminalized
by the statute. The Article then wades into the science of metabolites and explains
what they are, where they come from, and how they affect the body. Finally, it
concludes by identifying why Utah’s Metabolite Statute is constitutionally flawed
and why the prosecution of metabolites in the body should be prohibited in Utah.
II. THE STRUCTURE OF UTAH’S METABOLITE STATUTE, UTAH’S OTHER DRUG
LAWS, AND NATIONAL PER SE DRUG LAWS
Utah’s Metabolite Statute states, “[A] person may not operate or be in actual
physical control1 of a motor vehicle within [Utah] if the person has any measurable
controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person’s body.”2
“A person convicted of a violation of [this section] is guilty of a class B
misdemeanor,”3 which is punishable by up to six months in jail and a fine of
$1,000, plus an additional 90% surcharge and $40 legislative fee, for a maximum
total fine of $1,940.4 Additionally, “[t]he Driver License Division shall, if the
Utah courts define “actual physical control” very broadly. See, e.g., Richfield City v.
Walker, 790 P.2d 87, 93 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (looking at a multitude of factors to
determine whether defendant could have been driving a motor vehicle—and not limiting
the statutory language to only those people actually driving a motor vehicle—to find
defendant had “actual physical control” of the vehicle). Although the propriety or legality
of such a definition is the subject of frequent debate, this issue will not be addressed in this
Article. For the purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to know that individuals can be
convicted for being in actual physical control of a vehicle with a controlled substance
metabolite in their body without exhibiting dangerous behavior. See id.
2
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-517(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012) (emphasis added).
3
Id. § 41-6a-517(4)(a).
4
See id. § 51-9-401(1)(b)(i)(C) (LexisNexis 2010); id. §§ 76-3-204(2), -301(1)(d)
(LexisNexis 2004); id. § 78A-7-122(1) (LexisNexis 2009).
1
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person is 21 years of age or older on the date of arrest . . . suspend, for a period of
120 days, the driver license of [the] person convicted.”5 For persons younger than
twenty-one years old, or with prior convictions, the suspension may be lengthened
or the individual’s driver’s license may be revoked for a period of one to two
years.6
The Metabolite Statute is codified in the same chapter as Utah’s driving under
the influence (DUI) statute.7 But, the Metabolite Statute explicitly states it applies
“[i]n cases not amounting to a violation” of the DUI statute.8 Utah’s DUI statute
states, in relevant part:
A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle
within this state if the person is under the influence of alcohol, any drug,
or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that
renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle.9
Analyzing the two statutes together, the Metabolite Statute applies to
individuals who have detectable amounts of the controlled substance or its
metabolite in their system, but are not under the influence of a controlled
substance or its metabolite, and the metabolite does not make the individuals
incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle.10 In essence, rather than punishing
people for dangerous behavior, the Metabolite Statute punishes people for their
status11 of having previously used illegal drugs.12
Although little information is available regarding the creation and passage of
the Metabolite Statute specifically,13 valuable insight into the reasoning and logic
that created the section can be gleaned from an examination of other states with
similar laws. According to a study sponsored by the National Highway Traffic
Id. § 41-6a-517(6)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
Id. § 41-6a-517(6)(b) to -517(8).
7
See id. § 41-6a-502 (LexisNexis 2010).
8
Id. § 41-6a-517(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
9
Id. § 41-6a-502(1)(b) (LexisNexis 2010).
10
Compare id. § 41-6a-517(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012) (barring individuals from
operating or being in actual physical control of a vehicle if there is any measurable
controlled substance or metabolite present in their systems), with id. § 41-6a-502(1)(b)
(LexisNexis 2010) (prohibiting individuals from operating or being in actual physical
control of a vehicle if they are under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or both, that renders
them incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle).
11
See infra Part IV.
12
See State v. Robinson, 254 P.3d 183, 191–92 (Utah 2011) (“[S]imply having the
metabolite of a controlled substance in the body is similar to a ‘status’ of having previously
ingested the controlled substance.”).
13
The state legislature passed an early version of the statute in the 1980s. See UTAH
CODE ANN. § 41-6-44.6 (LexisNexis 1998) (recodified as amended at UTAH CODE ANN. §
41-6a-517 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012)). A thorough review of available state records and
online legal sources did not provide any information regarding the passing of the specific
provision at issue in this Article.
5
6
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Safety Administration, six other states have statutes similar to Utah’s Metabolite
Statute.14 Additionally, twelve other states have some form of law prohibiting
individuals from driving with prohibited drugs in their system, but not prohibiting
the metabolite of those drugs.15 Many of the remaining states have laws that focus
on actual impairment, rather than on the mere presence of drugs or their
metabolites in the system.16
In support of these zero tolerance statutes, commentators have argued that
there is a direct relationship between an unquantifiable amount of illicit drugs or
their metabolites in a person’s system and the individual’s ability to safely operate
a motor vehicle.17 These arguments generally assert that although “there [may be]
no meaningful quantification of the relationship of the use of . . . drugs with
evidence of impairment,” per se laws are still necessary to protect safety on the
roads because there could be some relationship between the drugs and their
metabolites and an individual’s ability to operate a motor vehicle safely.18 Other
advocates of these per se laws argue that there is a growing problem of what they
term “drugged driving.”19 According to these commentators, the easiest and most
effective way to combat drugged driving is through a zero-tolerance standard,
rather than through a standard requiring evidence of impairment or a quantifiable
amount of an active drug in an individual’s system.20 Finally, some commentators
argue a more pragmatic rationale: “The benefit of a per se standard is that
prosecutors do not have to meet more complex and difficult to use standards of
guilt.”21
Although these statutes are purportedly designed to make prosecution simpler
and more effective by removing the necessity to prove impairment or quantifiable
levels of drugs in the system, the statutes are rife with ambiguity and complexity,
which weaken their legitimacy and validity. One recent study attempted to test the

14

J. MICHAEL WALSH, A STATE-BY-STATE ANALYSIS OF LAWS DEALING WITH
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRUGS 4 (2009) (identifying Arizona, Delaware,
Georgia, Indiana, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, and Utah as states with a “zero tolerance”
approach).
15
See id. at 3–4 (identifying Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Rhode Island, Wisconsin,
Nevada, Ohio, Virginia, North Carolina, South Dakota, Hawaii, and New York with some
form of controlled substance law).
16
See id. (identifying Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Kentucky, Montana, South Carolina,
and Virginia as some of the states that use the standard of impairment to define “under the
influence”).
17
See, e.g., Mark F. Lewis & Betty J. Buchan, The Drugged Driver and the Need for
a “Per Se” Law, 72 FLA. B.J. 32, 37–38 (1998).
18
See, e.g., id. at 36 (discussing a case that applied this reasoning).
19
See THE WALSH GRP., THE FEASIBILITY OF PER SE DRUGGED DRIVING
LEGISLATION CONSENSUS REPORT 2 (2002), available at http://stopdruggeddriving.org/
pdfs/FeasabilityofPerSeLawsConsensusReport.pdf.
20
Id. at 4.
21
Drugged Driving Laws, STOP DRUGGED DRIVING, http://stopdruggeddriving.org/
laws.html (last visited May 20, 2013).
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actual effectiveness of these zero-tolerance statutes in making roads safer.22
According to the researchers, states that have instituted a zero-tolerance policy
have recorded very little to no information to determine if the statutes are
effective.23 Instead, prosecutors and law enforcement officials rely on anecdotal
stories to evaluate the statutes.24 The researchers reported that in general,
prosecutors and law enforcement officials felt the statutes were effective at easing
the burden of prosecution and conviction, but there was no mention of the ability
of these statutes to reduce the actual number of drugged or impaired drivers.25
Another problem undermining the value of per se statutes is the wide variety
of ways states prosecute the presence of metabolites in a driver’s system. As
discussed above, Utah’s statute criminalizes the presence of metabolites of any
controlled substance.26 By contrast, Minnesota’s statute makes it a crime for a
person to operate a motor vehicle if “the person's body contains any amount of a
controlled substance . . . or its metabolite, other than marijuana or
tetrahydrocannabinols.”27 Other states require that a certain quantity of any illegal
drug metabolite be found in a person’s system to sustain a conviction.28
The Utah Code does not contain any other provision punishing an individual
for the mere presence of controlled substance metabolites in the body. There are,
however, provisions that address the criminality of drug use in relation to the
presence of metabolites in an individual’s system. For example, Utah Code
Annotated section 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) makes it a crime “for any person knowingly and
intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance analog or a controlled
substance.”29 In the statute, “‘[p]ossession’ or ‘use’ means the joint or individual
ownership, control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the
application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption” of a controlled
substance.30 According to the Code, “‘Consumption’ means ingesting or having
any measurable amount of a controlled substance in a person's body, but . . . does
not include the metabolite of a controlled substance.”31 The Utah Supreme Court
has also found that the mere presence of a measurable amount or the metabolite of
a controlled substance is insufficient to show that a defendant used or possessed a
controlled substance within the state.32
See JOHN LACEY ET AL., DRUG PER SE LAWS: A REVIEW OF THEIR USE IN STATES 1
(2010) (studying the laws of twelve states that do not tolerate any amount of prohibited
drugs in a driver’s system while operating a motor vehicle to assess the effects of per se
drug laws).
23
See id. at 2.
24
Id.
25
See id.
26
See UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-517 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
27
MINN. STAT. § 169A.20 subdiv. 1(7) (West Supp. 2010).
28
See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4511.19 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012).
29
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2012).
30
Id. § 58-37-2(1)(ii).
31
Id. § 58-37-2(1)(c) (emphasis added).
32
State v. Ireland, 133 P.3d 396, 402 (Utah 2006).
22
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The question then becomes, what is it about metabolites that result in their
different treatment in various code sections within the state and among different
states? Why is it that Minnesota lawmakers felt their statute could exempt
marijuana metabolites while prosecuting for all other controlled substance
metabolites, but Utah lawmakers felt it was appropriate to punish the presence of
any controlled substance metabolites in an individual’s body? Similarly, why is it
that some states do not punish for the presence of metabolites in a driver’s system
while others require a minimum threshold level?33 Even more perplexing is why
Utah’s possession and use statutes explicitly prohibit prosecuting an individual
based on the presence of metabolites, but permit prosecuting an individual based
on the presence of metabolites if the individual happens to be in actual physical
control of a motor vehicle. To understand why metabolites have been given such
disparate treatment, this Article will discuss the science of metabolites in the
following section.
III. METABOLITES: NO MORE DANGEROUS THAN A HELPING OF VEGEMITE
It seems inane to compare a controlled substance metabolite to the bitter
Australian treat Vegemite. The two are drastically different. One is a byproduct of
the metabolic process of breaking down a controlled substance, and the other is
made from leftover brewer’s yeast. But what they do have in common is that, in
many cases, the two substances are pharmacologically inactive and do not have
any impact on an individual’s mental or physical capabilities. This Part explains
what metabolites are and where they come from. It also shows how many
metabolites do not have any influence on the abilities or capacities of the human
body. Finally this Part describes how the presence of controlled substance
metabolites in an individual’s blood or urine does nothing more than show that an
individual had ingested a controlled substance at some prior point.
A. What are Metabolites?
“A drug metabolite is a product or substance that comes from (and is
chemically different from) a parent drug; it is formed within the human body from
the parent drug by the process of biotransformation or metabolism.”34 When a drug
enters the body it goes through five distinct phases.35 These five stages are (1)
absorption, (2) distribution, (3) biotransformation, (4) translocation, and (5)

33

Virginia’s driving while intoxicated statute does not include a metabolite provision,
and instead focuses solely on impairment. The word “metabolite” does not appear
anywhere in Virginia’s code. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-266 (2009); see also OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4511.19 (LexisNexis Supp. 2012) (allowing for prosecution for the presence
of metabolites, but only if they exceed a certain threshold level).
34
FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, RESOLVING DRUG ISSUES 43 (1993).
35
Kurt M. Dubowski, Drug-Use Testing: Scientific Perspectives, 11 NOVA L. REV.
415, 523 (1987).
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excretion.36 Absorption refers to the process by which the drug is “ingested,
injected or absorbed through mucous membranes or other portals” into the body.37
During the distribution phase, the drug reaches the body’s circulation system and is
carried to all of the “tissues and organs of the body, where the free drug can exert
effects, or be stored, excreted, and metabolized or otherwise biotransformed,
depending upon the organ, tissue and drug.”38 During the distribution phase, some
tissues and organs are passive and completely unaffected by the presence of the
drug in the system.39 Other organs, however, such as the lungs and liver, “convert
the parent drug into chemically different metabolites or biotransformation
products, in which forms it can be stored, or eliminated” from the body.40
These “metabolites can be pharmacologically inert, or possess activity which
is less than, equal to, or greater than the parent drug.”41 This biotransformation
process continues until the entire drug has been eliminated from the body.42 The
final two stages, translocation and excretion, occur primarily through this
metabolic process.43 For example, ethanol is “predominantly disposed of through
extensive metabolism in the liver.”44 These metabolites are then disposed of
through bodily excretions such as urine.45
B. What Does It Mean when a Drug Test Reveals the Presence of a Drug
Metabolite in an Individual’s System?
Drug testing, whether in urine, blood, or some other bodily excretion, can
reveal the presence of both the active drug as well as the inactive metabolites of
the parent drug. But what does it mean for a test to come back positive for the
presence of a metabolite? A drug test revealing the presence of a metabolite does
not indicate intentional drug use,46 it does not reveal if the drug was accidentally
inhaled or injected, and it does not reveal the quantity or source of the metabolite.47
The presence of a metabolite in the body does not always equate with recent
absorption either.48 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that an individual’s
Id.
Id. at 524.
38
Id. at 524–25.
39
Id. at 525.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 523–26.
44
Id. at 525.
45
Id.
46
See id. at 516.
47
See id.
48
See Commonwealth v. DiPanfilo, 993 A.2d 1262, 1267 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012)
(recognizing that marijuana metabolites can remain in the body for months and that cocaine
metabolites remain in the body for two to four days after use); ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra
note 34, at 45.
36
37
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“pattern of elimination for a given drug cannot be predicted with perfect
accuracy.”49 Also, the bodily fluid being tested may affect the results of testing for
the presence of metabolites in the body.50
The rate at which drugs metabolize varies greatly among individuals.51 For
example, marijuana (or its active ingredient THC) is quickly detectable in the
blood stream after consumption.52 THC is immediately circulated through the body
where it is stored in fat tissue.53 The rate at which the body metabolizes a drug
varies conditioned upon a host of factors specific to the individual user.54 As THC
is metabolized, its inactive metabolites are released into the blood stream where, in
the average case, they can be detected for a few days up to several weeks.55 Also,
heavy or chronic use can lengthen the amount of time that metabolites appear in
the body.56
There is even some evidence indicating that, because marijuana metabolites
are easily absorbed by fat cells, the metabolites may become stored in fat tissues of
chronic users. The chronic user’s body may release those metabolites at a
significantly later period of time, anywhere from months to years, when the
individual experiences stress or begins exercising and dieting.57 Although such
claims are typically relegated to the annals of urban myths, a group of researchers
at the University of Sydney, Australia, conducted a study on rats to test the
plausibility of these stories.58 The researchers concluded that inducing stress or
depriving food from rats that had previously been exposed to marijuana triggered
an increased level of marijuana metabolites in the body, even when there had been
no recent exposure to the drug.59 The researchers extrapolated that their results
“might help to explain anomalous cases where prior cannabis users, that were

49

Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 658 (1989).
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 623 (1989) (recognizing that
metabolites of some drugs remain in the urine for a longer period of time than in blood).
51
See Charles R. Cordova, Jr., Note, DWI and Drugs: A Look at Per Se Laws for
Marijuana, 7 NEV. L.J. 570, 578–79 (2007).
52
Id.
53
Id. at 579.
54
Id. at 578–81. Cf. Kimberly S. Keller, Sobering Up Daubert: Recent Issues Arising
in Alcohol-Related Expert Testimony, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 111, 124 (2004) (identifying
weight, gender, age, mental state, drinking pattern, type of alcohol, amount of alcohol,
duration of ingestion, presence of food in the stomach, and the type of food as factors that
may affect the metabolic process of alcohol).
55
Cordova, supra note 51, at 578.
56
See FIONA J. COUPER & BARRY K. LOGAN, WASH. STATE PATROL, DRUGS AND
HUMAN PERFORMANCE FACT SHEET 9 (2004), available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/people/
injury/research/job185drugs/drugs_web.pdf.
57
N. Gunasekaran et al., Reintoxication: The Release of Fat-Stored Δ9tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) into Blood Is Enhanced by Food Deprivation or ACTH
Exposure, 158 BRIT. J. PHARMACOLOGY 1330, 1330 (2009).
58
See id.
59
Id. at 1336.
50
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exposed to extreme stress or had undergone intensive weight loss, tested positive
for THC a long time after they had refrained from cannabis use.”60
In sum, the presence of a metabolite in the body does not necessarily equate
with present intoxication.61 In fact, the presence of a metabolite does not even
equate with recent ingestion.62 Further, the presence of a metabolite cannot
demonstrate the method or amount of ingestion.63 The only relevant information
that a metabolite reveals is that at some prior time, an individual was exposed to
the chemical compound that metabolized into the present metabolite.64 It is for
these reasons that states have struggled to formulate a consistent policy for
handling metabolites in drivers’ systems. The only remaining question is whether
Utah can punish drivers for having the inactive metabolite of a controlled
substance in their bodies while being in actual physical control of motor vehicles.
IV. UTAH CANNOT PUNISH AN INDIVIDUAL FOR THE PRESENCE OF
METABOLITES IN THE BODY BECAUSE DOING SO WOULD BE
AN IMPERMISSIBLE STATUS OFFENSE
Although states have a great deal of power and discretion in punishing
individuals for drug use and possession, there are limits to that power. This Part
argues that punishing an individual for the presence of metabolites in the body is
an impermissible status offense in violation of the U.S. Constitution.
A. The State May Punish an Individual for Using Drugs
It has long been recognized that
[t]here can be no question of the authority of the State in the exercise of
its police power to regulate the administration, sale, prescription and use
of dangerous and habit-forming drugs. . . . The right to exercise this
power is so manifest in the interest of the public health and welfare, that
it is unnecessary to enter upon a discussion of it beyond saying that it is
too firmly established to be successfully called in question.65
Accordingly, Utah’s statutes that punish the use or possession of controlled
substances are not, on their face, constitutionally defective.66
The Utah Supreme Court recently reviewed the constitutionality of the state’s
statutes governing the possession or consumption of controlled substances.67 In
Id.
COUPER & LOGAN, supra note 56, at 9.
62
See id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 8–9.
65
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664 (1962) (quoting Whipple v. Martinson,
256 U.S. 41, 45 (1921)).
66
See State v. Robinson, 254 P.3d 183, 193 (Utah 2011).
60
61
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State v. Robinson,68 the defendant was arrested for driving under the influence.69
The results of a blood test revealed the presence of active methamphetamine in the
defendant’s body.70 Based on the results of the test, the State charged the defendant
with the possession or use of a controlled substance for having a measurable
amount of a controlled substance in his system.71 Following his conviction, the
defendant challenged the constitutionality of the possession or consumption
statutes.72 Recognizing the State’s inherent power to regulate the sale and use of
controlled substances, the court rejected the defendant’s due process, equal
protection, and cruel and unusual punishment arguments.73 Finally, the court
rejected the defendant’s argument under Robinson v. California74 that the statute
was punishing his status as a drug user rather than punishing his drug use.75 The
court found that because the statute was punishing him based on the measurable
amount of the active controlled substance found in his body, the statute was
punishing him for his use of the drug, not for his status.76 Because the defendant
still had active methamphetamine in his system, the court found he still had a
measurable amount of a controlled substance and was still using the drug.77 But,
the court did say, in dictum, that “simply having the metabolite of a controlled
substance in the body is similar to a ‘status’ of having previously ingested the
controlled substance. Thus, if Utah’s measureable amount provision criminalized
the presence of metabolites in a person’s body, [the defendant]’s argument might
have merit.”78 According to the court,
the “use” of a controlled substance clearly begins at ingestion, [and] that
“use” continues until the user is no longer under the influence of the
drug. In other words, use stops and a user is no longer under the
influence of drugs when the user no longer has a measurable amount of
the drug in his or her body.79
Accordingly, it remains permissible for a state to punish individuals while they are
still using the drug.80 But, when a statute punishes an individual for the presence of
a pharmacologically inactive drug metabolite in the body, the statute is prosecuting
See id. at 184.
254 P.3d 183.
69
Id. at 185.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 186–90.
74
370 U.S. 660 (1961).
75
Robinson, 254 P.3d at 190–92.
76
Id. at 191.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 191–92.
79
Id. at 191 (emphasis omitted).
80
See id.
67
68
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the individual’s status as a previous drug user, and not the individual’s actual use.81
This is bolstered by the fact that a drug metabolite is chemically different from the
actual drug and is typically pharmacologically inactive—having no effect on the
individual.82 The metabolic process has removed the controlled substance from the
body and the individual is no longer using the controlled substance.83 This then
raises the question of whether a state can punish individuals for their status as
previous drug users, proven only by the presence of an inactive drug metabolite in
the individuals’ systems.
B. The State May Not Criminalize an Individual’s Drug User Status
Although a state may criminalize drug use, it may not criminalize an
individual’s status as a drug user. On occasion, states have attempted to define
crimes not in terms of acts, but in states of being or statuses.84 Some historical
statutes “have made it a crime to be a vagrant, a common prostitute, a common
drunkard, a common gambler, or a beggar.”85 It was not until 1962, however, that
the U.S. Supreme Court questioned the validity of these status crimes.86 In
Robinson v. California, the State of California had made it a crime for an
individual to “be addicted to the use of narcotics.”87 In overturning the California
statute, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the statute “is not one which punishes a
person for the use of narcotics, for their purchase, sale or possession, or for
antisocial or disorderly behavior resulting from their administration . . . . Rather,
we deal with a statute which makes the ‘status’ of narcotic addiction a criminal
offense.”88 The Court continued by recognizing that a drug addiction can be
considered a disease and to punish the status of that disease would be to inflict a
cruel and unusual punishment upon the individual.89
Unfortunately, the Court did not clarify how far its holding would extend or
whether only a limited number of statuses, such as diseases and mental conditions,
were covered by the holding.90 Although the Robinson opinion left much to be
desired, “there is general consensus that the Court declared . . . that statutes that
make ‘status’ a crime are unconstitutional because they inflict cruel and unusual
punishment.”91
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The Supreme Court attempted to clarify its holding several years later, in
Powell v. Texas.92 There, the Court stated,
The entire thrust of Robinson’s interpretation of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause is that criminal penalties may be inflicted only if the
accused has committed some act, has engaged in some behavior, which
society has an interest in preventing, or perhaps in historical common
law terms, has committed some actus reus.93
With Powell, the focus has shifted away from the individual and towards the
requirement that the individual must have committed some act or exhibited some
behavior that society has an interest in preventing.94
Other courts have had the opportunity to expand the Robinson holding beyond
the context of California’s statute against narcotic addiction.95 For example, in
Parker v. Municipal Judge,96 the Nevada Supreme Court invalidated a law that
made it a crime to be a “disorderly person.”97 According to the statute, a disorderly
person was one who had the physical ability to work, had no visible means of
support, and was in a public place.98 The court held that because the statute was
punishing an individual’s status of being out of work and in a public place, without
having committed any act, the statute was unconstitutional.99
Similarly, laws that prohibit an individual from operating a motor vehicle
with the presence of a drug metabolite in the body are prohibited status crimes.100
According to one commentator discussing the application of per se statutes to
marijuana metabolites,
While most drug metabolites will remain in the blood for only a short
time, marijuana can be detected for weeks after the narcotic effect has
worn off. This contributes to punishing status as a user, not protecting
safety, a premise that was expressly found to be unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court.101
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In essence, punishing individuals for having a metabolite in the body fails to
further any legitimate goal, such as ensuring safety on the roads, because there is
no correlation between pharmacologically inactive metabolites and dangerous
driving. Instead, it is only punishing individuals for their status as a prior drug
user.102 Further, the presence of a metabolite alone cannot prove that an individual
knowingly engaged in any illegal behavior because metabolites do not reveal
whether a drug was consumed intentionally.103
Some may argue that Utah’s Metabolite Statute is not punishing individuals
for their status as prior drug users, but for the act of being in control of a motor
vehicle while a metabolite is still in the body. For example, in Arizona v.
Hammonds,104 an Arizona court considered a constitutional challenge to Arizona’s
metabolite statute.105 There, the court noted that the “presence of an inactive and
nonimpairing metabolite of an illicit drug in a driver’s urine does not necessarily
mean that there is no active component of that drug present in the driver’s
blood.”106 According to the court’s argument, it is appropriate for a state to punish
an individual for driving a motor vehicle with the metabolite in the body because
the metabolite may be the only way to establish that the individual was operating a
motor vehicle with drugs in the system.107 The court seemed particularly concerned
with the speed with which the metabolic process may break down drugs, making it
nearly impossible in some instances for the state to prove that an individual was
operating a motor vehicle with the active drug in the system.108
This reasoning is flawed, however, because it highlights the problems with
prosecuting individuals for having a drug metabolite in their system. Because there
is no way of knowing when, how, or where the metabolite entered the body, the
state cannot prove that an individual was operating a motor vehicle with the active
controlled substance in the body.109 Likewise, unless a urine or blood sample
reveals the presence of the active controlled substance in the body, absent
additional evidence, there is no proof that the individual was under the influence of
the controlled substance while operating the motor vehicle.110 All that the
metabolite reveals is that at some prior time the individual had an active controlled
substance in the body.111 Despite attempting to draw attention to the fact that the
individual chose to operate a motor vehicle, the statute still punishes an individual
for a status as a drug user, and not for any actual harm posed to the individual or
society.
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Because the statute is focused solely on punishing individuals for their status
as drug users and not for any specific activity or act, the statute must be considered
an unconstitutional status offense. But even if Utah courts find that the statute is
not an impermissible status offense, the statute may still be struck down on equal
protection grounds. The following Part shows how Utah’s Metabolite Statute
violates Utah’s equivalent of the federal Equal Protection Clause.
V. BY MAKING EXCEPTIONS FOR LEGAL USE, UTAH’S METABOLITE STATUTE
VIOLATES UTAH’S UNIFORM OPERATIONS OF LAWS CLAUSE
Utah’s Constitution requires that “[a]ll laws of a general nature shall have
uniform operation.”112 To determine whether a statute violates this requirement,
the court analyzes (1) whether the statute creates any classifications, (2) whether
the classifications impose any disparate treatment on persons similarly situated,
and (3) if there is disparate treatment, whether “the legislature had any reasonable
objective that warrants the disparity.”113 If the classification does not involve a
suspect class or a fundamental right, the court will engage in a rational basis
review of the legislature’s objective in creating the section.114 “The essence of the
uniform operation of laws principle is that ‘legislative classifications resulting in
differing treatment for different persons must be based on actual differences that
are reasonably related to the legitimate purposes of the legislation.’”115 The first
two questions, requiring a classification and disparate treatment, must be answered
112
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in the affirmative before the court will consider the third.116 The next Section
discusses these three questions in the context of the Metabolite Statute.
A. Utah’s Metabolite Statute Creates Classifications That Result in
Disparate Treatment
First, the metabolite statute creates classifications. The statute distinguishes
between individuals by creating an affirmative defense to prosecution for those
who have been given a prescription or legal authorization to use the controlled
substance.117 Second, the statute imposes disparate treatment on persons similarly
situated. Two individuals with metabolites and no active drug in their system after
ingesting the same controlled substance—one legally with a prescription and the
other illegally—will be treated differently if they are subsequently stopped while
in actual physical control of a motor vehicle. The individual who has a prescription
will escape legal liability, but the individual without a prescription may face
prosecution and the attendant consequences if convicted. Because the statute
makes classifications and those classifications result in disparate treatment, the
court must then consider whether “the legislature had any reasonable objective that
[would] warrant[] the disparity” under a rational basis review.118
B. Utah’s Metabolite Statute Fails Rational Basis Review
The first step in evaluating a statute under rational basis review is to
determine if the classification is reasonable.119 A court, in evaluating the
reasonableness of a classification should consider,
(1) if there is a greater burden on one class as opposed to another without
a reason; (2) if the statute results in unfair discrimination; (3) if the
statute creates a classification that is arbitrary or unreasonable; or (4) if
the statute singles out similarly situated people or groups without
justification.120
With regard to the Metabolite Statute, the classification fails this test. First, there is
a greater burden on those individuals without a prescription as compared to those
with a prescription without reason. Presumably, the statute was enacted for safety
reasons to prevent individuals with metabolites in their system from driving on the
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road.121 Assuming, arguendo, that metabolites in an individual’s system are
dangerous, the presence of metabolites in the system of an individual with a
prescription will be just as dangerous as a metabolite in the system of an individual
without a prescription. There is no reason for the greater burden—that is, the threat
of prosecution—placed on those without a prescription.
Second, the statute results in unfair discrimination. Without any justification
for the disparate treatment in the Metabolite Statute, the discrimination is
inherently unfair.
Third, the statute creates a classification that is arbitrary or unreasonable. It is
almost axiomatic to say that metabolites react in an individual’s body in a manner
that has no relationship to the external fact of whether the individual has a
prescription or legal authorization to use the medication. If a metabolite is
dangerous, it will be dangerous whether the user has a prescription or not.
Accordingly, the classification at issue here is either arbitrary in that there is no
justification, or unreasonable as it is merely a disguise by the state legislature to
create a status offense to punish drug users. Because there is no legitimate
justification to allow individuals with prescriptions to be in control of motor
vehicles with metabolites in their system while criminalizing individuals without
prescriptions, the statute is unreasonable and fails rational basis review.
Although the statute fails rational basis review, it is informative to complete
the analysis under Utah’s uniform operation of laws test. The second part of the
test is to determine whether “the legislature has a legitimate objective in creating
the classification.”122 The court does not, “however, ‘accept any conceivable
reason for the legislation. . . . Rather, [the court] judge[s] such enactments on the
basis of reasonable or actual legislative purposes.’”123
In the Metabolite Statute, there appears to be no legitimate objective in
creating the classification. The presumed objective in enacting the statute was to
make Utah’s roads safer.124 If it is dangerous for an individual to operate a motor
vehicle with a controlled substance metabolite in the body, it will be dangerous
regardless of whether the individual has a prescription. It would be unreasonable to
say that the state would be willing to allow a certain set of allegedly dangerous
drivers to operate on the roads, while prohibiting another set of equally dangerous
drivers. It is illustrative that Utah’s DUI law does not make a similar exception
allowing individuals with a prescription to control a motor vehicle while under the
influence of a controlled substance.125 This lack of distinction is for the obvious
reason that an individual under the influence of a drug, whether legally or illegally
consumed, is dangerous. Without a reasonable and legitimate purpose, the statute
fails rational basis review under Utah’s uniform operation of laws requirement.
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consumption of a drug “is most hazardous to the user and those around him”).
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This line of reasoning has been recognized by other jurisdictions. The Georgia
Supreme Court, in Love v. Georgia,126 found that a similar provision in the Georgia
code violated the state’s version of the uniform operation clause.127 At issue in
Love was a statute similar to Utah’s statute.128 On appeal the defendant attacked
the State’s interest in prohibiting drivers from operating a motor vehicle with a
controlled substance metabolite in their body by focusing on the exceptions, or
affirmative defenses, carved out by the Georgia General Assembly.129 The
defendant argued, and the court agreed, that
the statute allows a person with metabolites of legally-used [controlled
substances] in his body fluids to be convicted of driving with [controlled
substances] in his system only if it is established that he was “rendered
incapable of driving safely” while a person with metabolites of illegallyused [controlled substances] can be found guilty of driving with
[controlled substances] in his system without evidence of impairment.130
The court recognized that there is no difference in the effects of legally used
controlled substances and illegally used controlled substances.131 Because there is
no difference in how the controlled substances affect the body, the classification,
made by the Georgia General Assembly between legal users and illegal users was
arbitrary.132 In light of the fact that the classification was arbitrary, the court found
that the classification could not be supported by the purported state interest to
protect the safety of the roads and struck down the statute on equal protection
grounds.133
Similarly, Utah’s Metabolite Statute is constitutionally defective because it
violates Utah’s uniform operation of laws clause. Because the law impermissibly
distinguishes between similarly situated persons without any reasonable
justification, the statute is constitutionally defective and must be overturned.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Utah legislature and courts need to evaluate the constitutionality of
Utah’s Metabolite Statute. As it presently stands, the statute impermissibly
punishes an individual’s status as a past drug user and fails to punish any direct act
the individual may have committed. Because status offenses are unconstitutional,
the statute must be overturned. Further, the statute impermissibly classifies and
disparately impacts similarly situated individuals. Because there is no reasonable
126
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justification for this disparate treatment, the statute must be found in violation of
Utah’s uniform operation of laws clause and overturned. Although the Utah
legislature is free to prosecute individuals for actual drug use or possession, the
State may not use the Metabolite Statute as an end-run around the constitutional
protections provided to the citizens of Utah.

